Emotions and Religious Ethics
Given the dichotomy traditionally posited between reason and emotion, ethicists have generally downplayed or ignored the role of emotions in the moral life. In this paper I argue that the traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion should be abandoned, and that developing an account of emotions...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
1988
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| In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1988, Volume: 16, Issue: 2, Pages: 307-324 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | Given the dichotomy traditionally posited between reason and emotion, ethicists have generally downplayed or ignored the role of emotions in the moral life. In this paper I argue that the traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion should be abandoned, and that developing an account of emotions that attends to their cognitive structure can pave the way for a reassessment of the role emotions play in our efforts to live morally. I suggest that this reassessment is of particular interest to religious ethicists because adopting a "constructivist" theory of emotions can help explain how a religious vision of human life and history may bring about significant moral changes in the life of the believer. I try to illustrate this point by showing how a religious conception of the nature of moral relations may have an effect on the emotion of anger. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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