Why Law, Why Religion? - A Conversation Between a Lawyer and a Theologian
Categories such as religion and law are social constructs, proposed for some purpose or other, good or ill, but whose use is worthy of serious question. Consider, e.g., Karl Barth's insistence that Christianity is not a religion or Dietrich Bonhoeffer's coinage of "religionless Christ...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2008
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| In: |
Journal of law and religion
Year: 2008, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 373-377 |
| Online Access: |
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| Summary: | Categories such as religion and law are social constructs, proposed for some purpose or other, good or ill, but whose use is worthy of serious question. Consider, e.g., Karl Barth's insistence that Christianity is not a religion or Dietrich Bonhoeffer's coinage of "religionless Christianity." I will later offer a way of delineating how I use these categories of religion and law, but I am mindful in doing so that there are many ways these, and allied terms, are invoked. We should acknowledge, for instance, that there are many Christianities; many forms of Buddhism; and differing kinds of Islam. We should take note of the serious question whether "customary law" is really "law." How about "natural law"—is it really law or a "brooding omnipresence in the sky"? Are Torah, Shari'a, Dharma, and Tao cognate terms in some sense? Are they simultaneously "religion" and "law"? In what respect are canon law and common law both "lawful"? Should we adopt Wittgenstein's proposal that words, after all, are but tools embracing a "family of meanings"? |
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| ISSN: | 2163-3088 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of law and religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0748081400012637 |