A Re-Examination of the Ideal Type Concept
The following contention is examined: Ideal type concepts function in social theory only as preliminary devices which must eventually give way to operational formulations. For Max Weber, while ideal type concepts may instigate operational explanations, they have an abiding role in social theory beca...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
1963
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| Dans: |
The American catholic sociological review
Année: 1963, Volume: 24, Numéro: 3, Pages: 185-201 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | The following contention is examined: Ideal type concepts function in social theory only as preliminary devices which must eventually give way to operational formulations. For Max Weber, while ideal type concepts may instigate operational explanations, they have an abiding role in social theory because only they can explain the unique quality of the value-relevance of social data. For Talcott Parsons, ideal types are composed of two different kinds of concepts which represent elements that may vary independently of each other. With this distinction, Parsons demonstrates the possibility of combining a general analytic theory with type analysis. He also develops ideal type concepts on the level of general analytic theory with his distinction of "pattern variables." Parsons' theoretical advance of Weber's position is seen as important and logical. Consequently, the original contention is judged to be defective. Two shortcomings are observed in Parsons' stand of separating substantive factors from theory. One is that it mitigated too severely the personal elements of art and insight that enter into all theoretical work; but, more to the point, it overlooks how these personal elements differ in the natural and social sciences. The second is that since natural and social sciences differ widely in the scientific function of "making experiments," the two groups of sciences are similar only analogically and not logically as Parsons contends. |
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| ISSN: | 2325-7881 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: The American catholic sociological review
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/3708236 |