غیر المعلوم یمتنع الحکم علیه (Ghayr al-maʿlūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi): An Exploratory Anthology of a False Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy
In Islamic philosophy, knowledge is divided into ‘conception’ (taṣawwur) and ‘belief’ (taṣdīq). While there is no objection to dividing knowledge in this way, problems arose when belief was described as being ‘composed’ of conceptions. An early objection to belief’s dependence upon conceptions was b...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2014
|
| In: |
Oriens
Year: 2014, Volume: 42, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 397-453 |
| Further subjects: | B
‘impossible’ concepts
B ways of predication B Islamic Philosophy B paradoxes of self-reference |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In Islamic philosophy, knowledge is divided into ‘conception’ (taṣawwur) and ‘belief’ (taṣdīq). While there is no objection to dividing knowledge in this way, problems arose when belief was described as being ‘composed’ of conceptions. An early objection to belief’s dependence upon conceptions was based on a self-referential reading of the principle that ‘the unknown cannot be a subject of predication,’ which was another way of saying that ‘what is not conceived, cannot be believed.’ This objection was answered in various ways. While Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) may have been the first to know how to solve paradoxes of self-reference, it was Sirāj al-Dīn Urmawī (d. 682/1283) who dominated most of the later discussions. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1877-8372 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Oriens
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-04203005 |