Punishing and atoning: a new critique of penal substitution
The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2013
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| В: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Год: 2013, Том: 74, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 201-218 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Punishment
B Satisfaction theory B Atonement B Penal Substitution |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Не электронный вид
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| Итог: | The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one must at least believe the recipient is responsible for an offense. But God surely did not believe the innocent Christ was responsible for an offense, let alone the offense of human sin. So, the central factual claim is mistaken. In the final section, I show that this critique of penal substitution does not apply to the closely-related Anselmian satisfaction theory. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-012-9382-1 |
