Reply to Aijaz and Weidler on Hiddenness
In this brief reply I argue that criticisms of the hiddenness argument recently published in this journal by Imran Aijaz and Markus Weidler are without force. As will be shown, their critique of my conceptual version of the argument misses the mark by missing crucial distinctions. Their critique of...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2008
|
| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2008, Τόμος: 64, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 135-140 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Belief
B Conceptual B Analogical B Vanstone B Love B Relationship B Hiddenness |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Παράλληλη έκδοση: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή
|
| Σύνοψη: | In this brief reply I argue that criticisms of the hiddenness argument recently published in this journal by Imran Aijaz and Markus Weidler are without force. As will be shown, their critique of my conceptual version of the argument misses the mark by missing crucial distinctions. Their critique of my analogical version of the argument misunderstands that argument and also misapplies the work of W. H. Vanstone. And their critique of my view that belief is necessary for a certain kind of relationship with God overlooks both some central features of that kind of relationship and some good reasons for not accepting acceptance or anything similarly nonbelieving as a substitute for belief in this context. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-008-9170-0 |