Leibniz, creation and the best of all possible worlds

Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a sit...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Steinberg, Jesse R. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2007
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 3, Pages: 123-133
Further subjects:B Creation
B Best possible world
B God
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Parallel Edition:Electronic
Description
Summary:Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-007-9136-7