Fundamental Scientific Theories and the Problem of Metaphysical Impartiality: Comments on Stenmark’s Response to Golshani
In Vol. 3, No. 1 of the journal Theology and Science, a discussion took place between Mehdi Golshani and Mikael Stenmark on the concept of “Theistic Science.” Although both have much in common, their core disagreement revolves around the possibility of value-free science. Stenmark argues that as far...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado em: |
2022
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Em: |
Theology and science
Ano: 2022, Volume: 20, Número: 4, Páginas: 463-473 |
Classificações IxTheo: | AB Filosofia da religião BJ Islã |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
theistic science
B Islamic Philosophy B naturalistic science B Science and religion B neutral science |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | In Vol. 3, No. 1 of the journal Theology and Science, a discussion took place between Mehdi Golshani and Mikael Stenmark on the concept of “Theistic Science.” Although both have much in common, their core disagreement revolves around the possibility of value-free science. Stenmark argues that as far as the epistemic validation of fundamental scientific theories is concerned, that such validation can be metaphysically impartial. I will explore two of the critiques Stenmark presented in his counter-response, then I will examine his example of an impartial fundamental science. Finally, I will assess Stenmark's notion of “religiously relevant science” from an Islamicate philosophical perspective. |
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ISSN: | 1474-6719 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Theology and science
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2022.2124482 |