Śaṅkara’s philosophy of dreaming: Constructing an unreal world

This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Dalal, Neil (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: 2022
Em: Asian philosophy
Ano: 2022, Volume: 32, Número: 4, Páginas: 398-419
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão:B Śaṅkara 788-820 / Sonho / Consciência
Classificações IxTheo:AB Filosofia da religião
BK Hinduísmo
KBM Ásia
Outras palavras-chave:B Consciousness
B Śaṅkara (fl. 8th century CE)
B Dreaming
B Advaita Vedānta
B īśvara (God)
Acesso em linha: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descrição
Resumo:This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart from our minds. Dreaming thus illustrates the waking world’s nonrealism despite perceiving it as real, and that waking objects are consciousness alone. However, the dream illustration raises several questions: In what ways does illusory dream reality extend to waking objects? And does Śaṅkara view the objective waking world as the individual’s cognitive construction similar to the dream, or as īśvara’s cosmological construction? This article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual’s waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity; however, distinctions between individual and īśvara are ultimately indeterminable and lose meaning from the standpoint of nondual brahman.
ISSN:1469-2961
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Asian philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2120675