The origin of human morality: An evolutionary perspective on Mencius’s notion of sympathy
This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic acco...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Carfax
2022
|
| In: |
Asian philosophy
Year: 2022, Volume: 32, Issue: 4, Pages: 365-382 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Mengzi 372 BC-289 BC
/ Ingroup
/ Sympathy
/ Fremdgruppe
/ Evolutionary psychology
/ Moral sense
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism BM Chinese universism; Confucianism; Taoism NCC Social ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
mutual dependence
B Commiserating mind B Cooperation B Sympathy B regarding others as oneself or one’s kin B out-group distinction / in-group B Natural Selection |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This paper investigates Mencius’s notion of sympathy from the perspective of evolutionary biology. First, I point out that Mencius and evolutionary biologists concur that humans are endowed with a unique ability to sympathize with others beyond kin and friends. Subsequently, I offer an analytic account from an evolutionary perspective on how this ability emerged and developed as an innate human quality—especially referencing recent theories that state that cooperation is a crucial factor that helped foster such a quality. Further, this paper addresses in-group/out-group distinction in terms of the scope of sympathy. In particular, I respond to Donald Munro’s thesis that this distinction serves as a critical boundary for the workings of sympathy. Finally, I show that Mencius’s (and other Confucian thinkers’) thoughts on sympathy are not only compatible with modern evolutionary discourses but also contribute to the psychological mechanisms that may have enabled humans to regard others with sympathetic concern. Thus, this essay sheds light on the mechanisms of sympathy that Mencius and other Confucian thinkers illustrated as identifying oneself or one’s kin with others. I then surmise that such mechanisms most likely emerged as a fundamental psychological principle for humans initially reaching out to others. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1469-2961 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Asian philosophy
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2099108 |