When Monitoring Facilitates Trust

It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; Wanderer and Townsend 2013; Nguyen forthcoming; McMyler 2011, Castelfranchi and Falcone 2000; Frey 1993; Dasgupta 1988, Litzky et al. 2006) — especially three-place trust (i.e., A trusts...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gordon, Emma C. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2022
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2022, Volume: 25, Issue: 4, Pages: 557-571
Further subjects:B Romantic Relationships
B Applied Ethics
B Psychotherapy
B Couples Counselling
B Trust
B Monitoring
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Summary:It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; Wanderer and Townsend 2013; Nguyen forthcoming; McMyler 2011, Castelfranchi and Falcone 2000; Frey 1993; Dasgupta 1988, Litzky et al. 2006) — especially three-place trust (i.e., A trusts B to X), but sometimes also two-place trust (i.e., A trusts B, see, e.g., Baier 1986). Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which monitoring can be conducive to two-place trust, and to instances of three-place trust that are likely to be repeated over time—especially when previously established two-place trust has broken down. The result, I hope, is not any kind of abandoning of the important idea that monitoring can undermine trust, but an appreciation of where the conflict between monitoring and trust doesn’t lie - one from which future work will hopefully be better positioned to illuminate where exactly the conflict is.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10286-9