Resolving two tensions in (Neo-)Aristotelian approaches to self-control
A neo-Aristotelian approach to self-control has dominated both philosophy and the sciences of the mind. This approach endorses three key theses: (1) that self-control is a form of self-regulation aimed at desires that conflict with one’s evaluative judgments, (2) that high trait self-control is cont...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2022
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Further subjects: | B
Temperance
B Continence B Self-control B motivational conflict |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | A neo-Aristotelian approach to self-control has dominated both philosophy and the sciences of the mind. This approach endorses three key theses: (1) that self-control is a form of self-regulation aimed at desires that conflict with one’s evaluative judgments, (2) that high trait self-control is continence, which is distinguished from temperance by (a significant amount of) motivational conflict (which the continent person is good at resisting), and (3) that self-control is broad, in that such resistance can be not only direct (inhibiting or overriding conflicting desires) but also indirect (e.g., preventing conflicting desires from arising). There is an obvious tension between (1) and (3). I argue that the equally obvious resolution of this tension—allowing that self-control does not require occurrent conflicting desires but can instead be aimed at foreseeable conflicting desires—reveals a surprisingly unnoticed tension between (2) and (3). To resolve this tension, we are forced to either deny that high trait self-control is continence or deny that self-control is broad. If self-control is narrow, recent empirical evidence suggests that it may not be a good candidate for a human excellence concerning self-regulation. Thus, if we want to make room for such an excellence, we may need to deny that high trait self-control is continence. However we resolve these tensions, the Aristotelian status quo regarding self-control cannot stand. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10289-6 |