Reasons, Answers, and Goals
I discuss two arguments against the view that reasons are propositions. I consider responses to each argument, including recent responses due to Mark Schroeder, and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the discussion proceeds by comparing reasons to answers and goals.
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Brill
2012
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Στο/Στη: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Έτος: 2012, Τόμος: 9, Τεύχος: 4, Σελίδες: 491-499 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Mark Schroeder
B statism B Epistemic reasons B abstractionism B Practical Reason |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | I discuss two arguments against the view that reasons are propositions. I consider responses to each argument, including recent responses due to Mark Schroeder, and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the discussion proceeds by comparing reasons to answers and goals. |
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ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/174552412X628940 |