Preferring a Genetically-Related Child

Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of moral philosophy
Main Author: Rulli, Tina (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2016
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2016, Volume: 13, Issue: 6, Pages: 669-698
Further subjects:B genetic
B Rescue
B Parenthood
B procreative ethics
B biological
B Adoption
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for psychological similarity, for the sake of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. I argue that, with the possible exception of the pregnancy desire, these reasons fail to defeat a duty to adopt a child rather than create one, even assuming that we do have some leeway to favor our own interests.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-4681062