Shame, Guilt and Morality

Abstract The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-s...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of moral philosophy
Authors: Teroni, Fabrice (Author) ; Bruun, Otto (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2011
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2011, Volume: 8, Issue: 2, Pages: 223-245
Further subjects:B PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
B Shame
B Autonomy
B Responsibility
B Guilt
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Summary:Abstract The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame and the Social Argument to shame's link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion that they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt have obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/174552411X563574