The Mystery of Moral Perception

Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionabl...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Crow, Daniel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2016
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2016, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 187-210
Further subjects:B moral perception
B Non-naturalism
B Moral Realism
B Audi
B Intuitionism
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Summary:Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-4681053