Should the Best Qualified Be Appointed?*

The paper examines the view that individuals have a claim to the jobs for which they are the best qualified. It seeks to show this view to be groundless, and to offer, instead, a luck egalitarian account of justice in hiring. That account consists of three components: monism, non-meritocracy, and no...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of moral philosophy
Main Author: Segall, Shlomi (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2012
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2012, Volume: 9, Issue: 1, Pages: 31-54
Further subjects:B Justice
B Meritocracy
B Discrimination
B hiring
B jobs
B luck-egalitarianism
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Summary:The paper examines the view that individuals have a claim to the jobs for which they are the best qualified. It seeks to show this view to be groundless, and to offer, instead, a luck egalitarian account of justice in hiring. That account consists of three components: monism, non-meritocracy, and non-discrimination. To demonstrate the coherence of this view, two particular internal conflicts are addressed. First, luck egalitarian monism (the view that jobs are not special) may end up violating the non-discrimination requirement. Second, non-discrimination, it is often suggested, cannot be defined without reference to qualifications, thus violating the non-meritocracy requirement. The paper seeks to address these, as well as other, potential objections, and show that whereas meritocratic accounts are without basis, luck egalitarianism provides a coherent and attractive account of justice in hiring.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/174552411X592149