Defending Honor and Beyond: Reconsidering the Relationship between Seemingly Futile Defense and Permissible Harming

In Helen Frowe’s book, Defensive Killing, she argues that some cases of seemingly futile self-defense are actually instances of justifiable defense of the victim’s honor. This paper explores Frowe’s claim, first by isolating the central cases and then by examining her rejection of punitive reasons....

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2018
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2018, Volume: 15, Issue: 6, Pages: 683-705
Further subjects:B Honor
B Helen Frowe
B Self-defense
B Defensive Killing
B Necessity
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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