Thinking about Normativity: Ralph Wedgwood on 'Ought'
Abstract Ralph Wedgwood's The Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form 'I ought to '. The theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2010
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2010, Volume: 7, Issue: 1, Pages: 133-144 |
| Further subjects: | B
Agency
B Rationality B OUGHTS B Value B Metaphysics B Normativity |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Abstract Ralph Wedgwood's The Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form 'I ought to '. The theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle that 'the intentional is normative'. I argue, first, that by being merely about oughts, Wedgwood's account leaves out one essential constituent of normativity: value. Secondly, I argue that mainly because of this, the account faces a serious issue of relevance. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/174046809X12544019605987 |
