Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

Abstract There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to d...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shafer-Landau, Russ (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2007
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2007, Volume: 4, Issue: 3, Pages: 311-329
Further subjects:B Explanatory Power
B Theism
B Causal Power
B Moral Facts
B Realism
B Gilbert Harman
B Morals
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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