Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument
Abstract There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to d...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2007
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| В: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Год: 2007, Том: 4, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 311-329 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Explanatory Power
B Theism B Causal Power B Moral Facts B Realism B Gilbert Harman B Мораль (мотив) |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | Abstract There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/1740468107083247 |
