Minimal Beneficence through the Lens of Material Value-Ethics
I argue for three principles of minimal beneficence, which constrain when and what at least we are obligated to do on behalf of someone. All three may be accepted by both the consequentialist Peter Singer and by his staunch opponents in material value-ethics, who are typically anti-consequentialists...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
2022
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2022, Volume: 29, Issue: 2, Pages: 263-295 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Value ethics
/ Charitable works
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | I argue for three principles of minimal beneficence, which constrain when and what at least we are obligated to do on behalf of someone. All three may be accepted by both the consequentialist Peter Singer and by his staunch opponents in material value-ethics, who are typically anti-consequentialists. Either side would philosophically benefit from accepting the principles. At the same time, the first principle is rarely applicable, the second only when the available relevant evidence is not too complex, and the third only as a prompt to keep thinking seriously about how to practice beneficence. Even so, I derive some widely applicable, practical implications. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.29.2.3290921 |