Eligibility for assisted dying: not protection for vulnerable people, but protection for people when they are vulnerable
Downie and Schuklenk1 provide a clear narrative of the development of Canadian policy on medically assisted dying. This is very helpful for considering specific aspects of the continuing deliberations in Canada. This commentary presents an alternative perspective on the authors’ argument that narrow...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2021, Volume: 47, Issue: 10, Pages: 672-673 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Downie and Schuklenk1 provide a clear narrative of the development of Canadian policy on medically assisted dying. This is very helpful for considering specific aspects of the continuing deliberations in Canada. This commentary presents an alternative perspective on the authors’ argument that narrow eligibility criteria for medical assistance in dying (MAiD) are discriminatory and unjustified. I argue that disability or mental illness as sole reason for accessing MAiD removes protections for all people who have times in their life when they have mental illness or disability combined with intolerable suffering. I claim that individuals do not make their best, self-actualising decisions at those times and the supposed protections of vague terms such as incurable, advanced and decline are not clinically useful for evaluating eligibility for individuals with chronic health conditions.Within discussion of the impact of social determinants of health on access to MAiD, the authors present the argument that decisionally capable people with mental illness or disabilities as their sole underlying condition should be allowed to access MAiD. The authors state that opposing this access sacrifices patient rights and strips people of their agency. To support their argument, they embrace the idea that people with mental illness or disabilities belong to an identifiable cohort. They claim that … |
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| ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2021-107794 |