Advancing technologies as both our saviour and our doom
Olaf (from Disney’s Frozen 2) has a theory about advancing technologies being both our saviour and our doom. While we ought to avoid over-analysing claims of fictitious snowmen, we can pause to consider whether it is possible for an advancing technology to be both our saviour and our doom. I will ma...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
BMJ Publ.
2021
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| In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2021, Volume: 47, Issue: 3, Pages: 131-132 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Olaf (from Disney’s Frozen 2) has a theory about advancing technologies being both our saviour and our doom. While we ought to avoid over-analysing claims of fictitious snowmen, we can pause to consider whether it is possible for an advancing technology to be both our saviour and our doom. I will maintain that it is. But for now, note how it is tempting to resolve the overlap by thinking about advancing technologies and individuals. In a possible reformulation of Olaf’s claim, advancing technology can be one person’s saviour, but in being so, is another person’s doom. This reformulation is a type of an ‘individualisation argument’ against advancing technology. Specifically, it is the claim that while an individual’s use of technology may solve their iteration of a problem, it may also undermine a societal response to the broader problem.Peterson, in this edition’s Feature Article, has this type of ‘individualisation argument’ in his sights when he considers its application to non-medical egg freezing (NMEF). That is, freezing an egg for social reasons (such as, to provide for more time to find a partner and/or to establish a career before embarking on parenthood) rather than medical reasons (such as, to treat a potentially threatening medical condition). Peterson formulates the ‘individualisation argument’ in the following way1:P1: It is morally wrong to let individuals use technology X—in order to try to handle a problem that is social in nature—if the use of X will somehow work against a social solution to a social problem P.P2: If individuals make use of a technology like … |
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| ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2021-107284 |