Conscientious objection to referrals
Christopher Cowley1 has recently put forward three arguments against the legal accommodation of a general practitioner’s conscientious objection (CO) to abortion referrals.i He claims that the adoption of these arguments does not undermine a more general right to CO to involvement in abortion. I arg...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
BMJ Publ.
2019
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| In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 45, Issue: 4, Pages: 277-279 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Christopher Cowley1 has recently put forward three arguments against the legal accommodation of a general practitioner’s conscientious objection (CO) to abortion referrals.i He claims that the adoption of these arguments does not undermine a more general right to CO to involvement in abortion. I argue that Cowley is seriously mistaken. His three arguments, especially the second and third, proceed on a path directed towards the outright rejection of a right to CO in healthcare contexts. A common problem with Cowley’s three arguments is that they overlook the peremptory significance for CO analysis of both the internal, deliberating perspective of those with a CO and the good of moral integrity. This paper supports the view that either there are strong prima facie grounds for holding that a right to CO extends in principle to the issue of referrals or the claim of a general right to CO is easily assailable. |
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| ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2018-105067 |