Mitochondrial donation and ‘the right to know’
In this paper, I examine two key arguments advanced by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the Nuffield Council justifying anonymous mitochondrial donation, even though the ‘right to know’ is recognised in standard gamete donation. I argue that the two arguments they offer, w...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2016
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| In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2016, Volume: 42, Issue: 10, Pages: 678-684 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In this paper, I examine two key arguments advanced by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and the Nuffield Council justifying anonymous mitochondrial donation, even though the ‘right to know’ is recognised in standard gamete donation. I argue that the two arguments they offer, what I call the argument from genetic connection and the argument from personal characteristics, are unsuccessful. However, I provide additional reasons for why recognising the right to know in gamete donation but not in mitochondrial donation may be justified. I further argue that the status quo in the UK, which is to not recognise a right to know in mitochondrial donation, is provisionally acceptable. |
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| ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103587 |