Why sore throats don't aggregate against a life, but arms do
Part IV of Bioethical Prescriptions 1 masterfully joins philosophical imagination and rigour in its discussion of moral questions that arise in allocating scarce healthcare resources. I shall focus on a question on which Kamm's analysis yields remarkable insight, even though I disagree with som...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2015
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| In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2015, Volume: 41, Issue: 6, Pages: 492-493 |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Part IV of Bioethical Prescriptions 1 masterfully joins philosophical imagination and rigour in its discussion of moral questions that arise in allocating scarce healthcare resources. I shall focus on a question on which Kamm's analysis yields remarkable insight, even though I disagree with some of her conclusions. The question is: Suppose that one must either (a) save all members of a group of A-people (who are otherwise fine) from an identical individual loss, short of death or (b) save a single young person, B, from a terminal illness, thereby restoring him to good health for a normal lifespan. What ought one to do?In Bioethical Prescriptions and elsewhere, Kamm argues for the following two-part answer: If the loss to each person in the A-group is very small, then one must save B's life, no matter how numerous the A-group. If the loss to each person in the A-group is close enough to B's loss, then for a very large number of people in the A-group, one is permitted to save the A-group. Kamm offers the following principle underlying (i): Each of us who is otherwise fine has a duty to suffer (at least) a relatively minimal loss (e.g., a sore throat) in order to save another person's life. So long as suffering the small loss is a duty for any given person, no number of the small losses can be aggregated to outweigh saving the life (p. 369).1 This antiaggregation principle has an … |
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| ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102036 |