After-birth abortion: the intuition argument
The argument advanced by Giubilini and Minerva is an important one, but it suffers from some shortcomings. I briefly criticise their reasoning and method and argue that after birth abortion should be limited largely to infants with disabilities. My argument is based not on solid scientific evidence...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
BMJ Publ.
2013
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In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2013, Volume: 39, Issue: 5, Pages: 5 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | The argument advanced by Giubilini and Minerva is an important one, but it suffers from some shortcomings. I briefly criticise their reasoning and method and argue that after birth abortion should be limited largely to infants with disabilities. My argument is based not on solid scientific evidence or cold rational reasoning but on intuition, something that has long been discounted as irrelevant in biomedical discourse. I end with a recommendation to all of us: in order to make a change, one should not only choose one’s battles, but also one’s weapon and mode of attack. |
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ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100688 |