Personhood, harm and interest: a reply to Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva

In the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ arguments are made in favour of the moral permissibility of intentionally killing newborn infants, under particular conditions. Here we argue that their arguments are based on an indefensible view of personhood, and we question the log...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Beard, Matthew (Author)
Contributors: Lynch, Sandra
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2013
In: Journal of medical ethics
Year: 2013, Volume: 39, Issue: 5, Pages: 1-4
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Summary:In the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ arguments are made in favour of the moral permissibility of intentionally killing newborn infants, under particular conditions. Here we argue that their arguments are based on an indefensible view of personhood, and we question the logic of harm and interest that informs their arguments. Furthermore, we argue that the conclusions here are so contrary to ordinary moral intuitions that the argument and conclusions based upon it—including those which defend more mainstream methods of abortion—should be treated with immediate suspicion.
ISSN:1473-4257
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100692