To kill is not the same as to let die: a reply to Coggon

Coggon’s remarks on a previous paper on active and passive euthanasia elicit a clarification and an elaboration of the argument in support of the claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. The relevant moral duties are different in nature, strength and content. Moreover,...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:  
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: McLachlan, H. V. (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Gargar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado: BMJ Publ. 2009
En: Journal of medical ethics
Año: 2009, Volumen: 35, Número: 7, Páginas: 456-458
Acceso en línea: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:Coggon’s remarks on a previous paper on active and passive euthanasia elicit a clarification and an elaboration of the argument in support of the claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. The relevant moral duties are different in nature, strength and content. Moreover, not all people who are involved in the relevant situations have the same moral duties. The particular case that is presented in support of the claim that to kill is not the same as to let die is based upon a rejection of consequentialism.
ISSN:1473-4257
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1136/jme.2008.027409