Can unequal be more fair? A response to Andrew Avins
In this paper, we respond to Andrew Avins's recent review of methods whose use he advocates in clinical trials, to make them more ethical. He recommends in particular, “unbalanced randomisation”. However, we argue that, before such a recommendation can be made, it is important to establish why...
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Опубликовано: |
2000
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В: |
Journal of medical ethics
Год: 2000, Том: 26, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 179-182 |
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Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Итог: | In this paper, we respond to Andrew Avins's recent review of methods whose use he advocates in clinical trials, to make them more ethical. He recommends in particular, “unbalanced randomisation”. However, we argue that, before such a recommendation can be made, it is important to establish why unequal randomisation might offer ethical advantages over equal randomisation, other things being equal. It is important to make a pragmatic distinction between trials of treatments that are already routinely available and trials of restricted treatments. We conclude that unequal randomisation could, indeed, be an ethical compromise between protecting the interests of participants and those of society. |
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ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/jme.26.3.179 |