Obligation and consent
It is often supposed, as in Professor Kluge's article (1), that one can only acquire an obligation by free consent. This paper argues that although this is true of some types of obligation, including the ones discussed by Professor Kluge, it is by no means true of all. In particular, it is argu...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
BMJ Publ.
1989
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In: |
Journal of medical ethics
Year: 1989, Volume: 15, Issue: 4, Pages: 195-196 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | It is often supposed, as in Professor Kluge's article (1), that one can only acquire an obligation by free consent. This paper argues that although this is true of some types of obligation, including the ones discussed by Professor Kluge, it is by no means true of all. In particular, it is argued, society may legitimately impose obligations on us without our consent, if the obligations are reciprocated, or if it is simply enforcing an already existing moral obligation. |
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ISSN: | 1473-4257 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of medical ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1136/jme.15.4.195 |