Faith and Doubt at the Cry of Dereliction: a Defense of Doxasticism

Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by B...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Mugg, Joshua (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado: 2022
En: Sophia
Año: 2022, Volumen: 61, Número: 2, Páginas: 253-265
Otras palabras clave:B Belief
B Non-doxasticism
B Doxasticism
B Faith
B Doubt
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Sumario:Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by Beth Rath (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 81, 161-169, 2017), is to use a particular story, in this case Jesus Christ’s cry of dereliction, to argue that someone had propositional faith while ceasing to believe. Thus, doxasticism is false. Rath’s approach of analyzing a case from scripture has the advantage of allowing her to provide evidence for the claim that a subject had propositional faith but lost belief. However, I argue that Rath faces a dilemma: on the interpretation of the passage necessary for her argument, either Christ did lose his propositional faith that God was with him, or else he did not lose his belief that God was with him. Either way, she must reject a key premise in her argument.
ISSN:1873-930X
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-020-00814-4