Demystifying the Deep Self View

Deep Self views of moral responsibility have been criticized for positing mysterious concepts, making nearly paradoxical claims about the ownership of one’s mental states, and promoting self-deceptive moral evasion. I defend Deep Self views from these pervasive forms of skepticism by arguing that so...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gorman, August (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2022
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2022, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, Pages: 390-414
Further subjects:B Deep Self
B Epistemic injustice
B internality
B Alienation
B Moral Responsibility
B testimonial injustice
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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