Demystifying the Deep Self View
Deep Self views of moral responsibility have been criticized for positing mysterious concepts, making nearly paradoxical claims about the ownership of one’s mental states, and promoting self-deceptive moral evasion. I defend Deep Self views from these pervasive forms of skepticism by arguing that so...
| Autore principale: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
|
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2022
|
| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Anno: 2022, Volume: 19, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 390-414 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Deep Self
B Epistemic injustice B internality B Alienation B Moral Responsibility B testimonial injustice |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | Deep Self views of moral responsibility have been criticized for positing mysterious concepts, making nearly paradoxical claims about the ownership of one’s mental states, and promoting self-deceptive moral evasion. I defend Deep Self views from these pervasive forms of skepticism by arguing that some criticism is hasty and stems from epistemic injustice regarding testimonies of experiences of alienation, while other criticism targets contingent features of Deep Self views that ought to be abandoned. To aid in this project, I provide original naturalistic analyses of “Self” and “internality” that replace the view’s metaphorical language with common-sensical concepts that make clear their usefulness. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223564 |
