Are we bodies or souls?
What makes us human? Richard Swinburne presents new philosophical arguments, supported by modern neuroscience, for the view that we are immaterial souls sustained in existence by our brains.
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Book |
| Language: | English |
| Subito Delivery Service: | Order now. |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press USA- OSO
2019
|
| In: | Year: 2019 |
| Reviews: | [Rezension von: Swinburne, Richard, 1934-, Are we bodies or souls?] (2020) (Göcke, Benedikt Paul, 1981 -)
[Rezension von: Swinburne, Richard, 1934-, Are we bodies or souls?] (2022) (Klein, Terrance) [Rezension von: Swinburne, Richard, 1934-, Are we bodies or souls?] (2019) (Goldschmidt, Tyron, 1982 -) |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Body
|
| Further subjects: | B
Mind and body
B Electronic books B Human Beings |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
| Summary: | What makes us human? Richard Swinburne presents new philosophical arguments, supported by modern neuroscience, for the view that we are immaterial souls sustained in existence by our brains. Cover -- Are We Bodies or Souls? -- Copyright -- Contents -- 1: Introduction -- A. What This Book Is About -- B. The Problem of Personal Identity -- C. The Plan of This Book -- 2: Physicalism and Property Dualism -- A. Human Beings -- B. Substances, Properties, and Events -- C. Physicalism -- D. Property Dualism -- E. The Different Kinds of Pure Mental Events -- F. Physical and Mental Substances -- 3: Theories of Personal Identity -- A. Different Kinds of Complex Theories of Personal Identity -- B. The Strong Body Theory of Personal Identity -- C. The Strong Brain Theory of Personal Identity -- D. Mental and Mixed Theories of Personal Identity -- E. Objections to All Strong Complex Theories of Personal Identity -- F. Partial Identity Theories of Personal Identity -- G. Weak Complex Theories of Personal Identity -- H. The Simple Theory of Personal Identity -- 4: Descartes's Argument for the Soul -- A. The Principle of the Identity of Composites -- B. Descartes's Original Argument -- C. My Amended Version of Descartes's Argument -- D. Aquinas's Theory of the Relation of Soul and Body -- 5: We Know Who We Are -- A. Informative and Uninformative Designators -- B. Informative Designators of Mental Properties -- C. Informative Designators of Mental Substances -- D. Each Human Soul Has Its Own Thisness -- Appendix on 'Metaphysical Modality' -- 6: Souls and Bodies Interact -- A. Brain Events Often Cause Pure Mental Events -- B. Rational Belief -- C. Pure Mental Events Often Cause Other Mental Events -- D. Pure Mental Events Often Cause Brain Events -- E. The Libet Programme -- 7: Could Science Explain Souls? -- A. Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Evidence for It, Summarized -- B. When Does a Human Soul Begin and Cease to Exist? -- C. Is the Same Human Body Normally Connected to the Same Soul? -- D. When Does the Soul Cease to Exist?. |
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| Item Description: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| ISBN: | 0192567209 |