Back to the basics in attachment to God: Revisiting theory in light of theology
This article argues that contemporary theories of attachment to God lack a clear and coherent theological basis. The absence of theological argument weakens attachment theory as applied to relationships with God on three main grounds. First, cognitive social models easily slip into reductionism. Sec...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2007
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| In: |
Journal of psychology and theology
Year: 2007, Volume: 35, Issue: 2, Pages: 112-122 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | This article argues that contemporary theories of attachment to God lack a clear and coherent theological basis. The absence of theological argument weakens attachment theory as applied to relationships with God on three main grounds. First, cognitive social models easily slip into reductionism. Second, these models fail to consider fully the attributes of God to whom the individual attaches. Third, these models overlook that relationships with God and humans could include inter-subjectivity. Trinitarian theology as proposed by Colin Gunton is discussed and its usefulness for attachment theory examined. It is argued that models of attachment to God based in trinitarian theology can provide a coherent account of the origins of human relationship with God and of human inter-subjectivity. They can also suggest reasons for the existence of compensatory motivation, offer developmental models of spiritual maturity and draw attention to the importance of relationships with the Christian community for spiritual development. |
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| ISSN: | 2328-1162 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of psychology and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/009164710703500202 |