Promulgation as Formal Cause in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Definition of Law
This article argues that promulgation is the formal cause of St. Thomas Aquinas’s definition of law, and that an ordinance of reason is the material cause. This conclusion is based on the premises that promulgation is related to ordinance of reason as specific difference to genus, and specific diffe...
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| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Angelicum
Year: 2021, Volume: 98, Issue: 2, Pages: 255-272 |
| Summary: | This article argues that promulgation is the formal cause of St. Thomas Aquinas’s definition of law, and that an ordinance of reason is the material cause. This conclusion is based on the premises that promulgation is related to ordinance of reason as specific difference to genus, and specific difference is related to genus as form to matter. Three differing opinions are examined, namely, that ordinance of reason is a formal cause and an act of the will is the material cause, and two opinions that see, for different reasons, promulgation as a material cause and ordinance of reason as a formal cause. These opinions are instructive in determining the formal quality of reason in an ordinance or command, and in determining that what individuates can be taken as a material cause. However, neither of these principles is sufficient in establishing something other than promulgation as the formal cause of the definition of law as such. Lastly, an objection that viewing an ordinance of reason as material cause lessens reason’s importance is answered. |
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| ISSN: | 1123-5772 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Angelicum
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