Concessive Knowledge Attributions Cannot Be Explained Pragmatically

“I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David , have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Stoutenburg, Gregory (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2022
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2022, Volume: 12, Issue: 2, Pages: 171-182
Further subjects:B infallibilism
B semantics of knowledge attributions
B Fallibilism
B concessive knowledge attributions
B pragmatics of knowledge attributions
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520 |a “I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David , have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences sound odd, and thus do not undermine fallibilism. I argue that the proffered pragmatic explanations fail and I raise challenges for any possible pragmatic explanation of the character of concessive knowledge attributions. It is reasonable to conclude that concessive knowledge attributions are genuine contradictions. 
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