"Torah for Its Own Sake," "Torah Not for Its Own Sake," and the Third Way
In this article I take issue with the interpretation that is central to Leibovitz's approach to the Jewish religion in general and to Maimonides in particular. I show that it is incompatible with certain elements in Maimonides' thought, and I offer an alternative, and to my mind more consi...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Penn Press
1988
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| In: |
The Jewish quarterly review
Year: 1988, Volume: 79, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 153-163 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In this article I take issue with the interpretation that is central to Leibovitz's approach to the Jewish religion in general and to Maimonides in particular. I show that it is incompatible with certain elements in Maimonides' thought, and I offer an alternative, and to my mind more consistent, interpretation. Leibovitz's interpretation reveals a hidden level, largely corresponding to what other commentators on Maimonides have defined as the esoteric aspect of his thought. However, Leibovitz differs from his predecessors in proposing a criterion that distinguishes between the two levels of meaning, that between "Torah for its own sake" and "Torah not for its own sake" (torah li-shemah and torah she-lo' li-shemah). According to this interpretation, Maimonides does not regard religion per se as a means toward any specific end. In my opinion, Leibovitz's interpretation of Maimonides' belief in "Torah for its own sake" and "performance of miṣwot for the sake of performance of miṣwot" is not convincing. Nevertheless, I agree with him that Maimonides does not accept the doctrine of reward and punishment. This suggests a rather different interpretation, according to which Maimonides would replace the principle of just recompense with a rational doctrine of natural consequence. It would appear, therefore, that Maimonides distinguishes two possible modes of attaining a desired end: as recompense for the performance of some action, or as the outcome of an appropriate natural process. In this sense I agree with Leibovitz's assertion that the doctrine of reward and punishment is not an integral component of Maimonides' world-view or faith. But Maimonides' rejection of the doctrine in its naive form is not a consequence of his acceptance of the principle of "Torah li-shemah," i.e., "performance of miṣwot for the sake of performance of miṣwot"; rather, he proposes a rationalistic-naturalistic approach. |
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| ISSN: | 1553-0604 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: The Jewish quarterly review
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/1454250 |