Fundamental and technical methods of ethics
Consequentialists and deontologists alike tacitly presume that moral decisions should be reached from basic assessments of theoretically set moral value. The presumption they share, I argue, is seriously mistaken. We need to distinguish two general methods of reaching moral decisions, that of the mo...
| Published in: | International journal of value-based management |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Proquest
1996
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| In: |
International journal of value-based management
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| Further subjects: | B
Decision-making
B Ethics B moral decision B Deontology B fundamental analysis B Moral Philosophy B technical analysis B Values B moral values B Consequentialism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Consequentialists and deontologists alike tacitly presume that moral decisions should be reached from basic assessments of theoretically set moral value. The presumption they share, I argue, is seriously mistaken. We need to distinguish two general methods of reaching moral decisions, that of the moral fundamentalist and that of the moral technician. Moral fundamentalists and technicians differ in their methods, but not in their aims. The distinction between the two general methods of ethics is particularly important for consequentialism. I maintain that a consequentialist may be without inconsistency a utilitarian fundamentalist and a deontological technician. I suggest that when we pay heed to our epistemic constraints, we have strong consequentialist grounds for adopting this unusual position. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8528 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of value-based management
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF00420510 |