Imagination and the Experience of Moral Objectivity
Different notions of objectivity support different notions of what is required for a moral value or obligation to be experienced as objective. If the objectivity of a property (moral or otherwise) requires that it can exist even when we fail to notice its existence, then experiencing a property (mor...
Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2022
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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Further subjects: | B
Imagination
B Objectivity B Moral phenomenology B Independence |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Different notions of objectivity support different notions of what is required for a moral value or obligation to be experienced as objective. If the objectivity of a property (moral or otherwise) requires that it can exist even when we fail to notice its existence, then experiencing a property (moral or otherwise) as objective will require that we imagine it appearing in some way that is not presently available to us. Explaining what that imagining involves is the central task of this paper. Defending the epistemic value of such imagining is a secondary aim. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10234-z |