Evil and maximal greatness
By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
2022
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Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2022, Τόμος: 91, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 93-109 |
Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Plantinga, Alvin 1932-
/ Οντολογική απόδειξη της ύπαρξης του Θεού
/ Τροπικότητα (γλωσσολογία)
/ Μέγεθος
/ Maximum
/ Κριτική (μοτίβο)
/ Το Κακό
/ Αρχή φαύλου κύκλου (φιλοσοφία) (Φιλοσοφία (μοτίβο))
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Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού VA Φιλοσοφία |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Modal problem of evil
B Maximal greatness B Modal ontological argument B Plantinga |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have complained, but circular in the strongest sense of the term. Based on reflections on the relation between the notions of coherence and possibility, I shall defend two arguments, previously proposed by Tooley (Mind 90:422–427, 1981) and Guleserian (Nous 17:221–238, 1983), against the existence of a maximally great being. The article concludes with some critical remarks on Plantinga’s rationale for conceiving God as such a being. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09810-1 |