Contingency in the Late Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards
Jonathan Edwards is often portrayed as being a thoroughgoing determinist, thus precluding every sort of contingency. This judgment arises most often—and justifiably so— from what he asserts in his Freedom of the Will (1754). A contrary judgment emerges, however, when his dissertation Concerning the...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Jonathan Edwards studies
Year: 2021, Volume: 11, Issue: 2, Pages: 117-149 |
| Further subjects: | B
Early Modern History
B Philosophy B American Religious History |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei registrierungspflichtig) |
| Summary: | Jonathan Edwards is often portrayed as being a thoroughgoing determinist, thus precluding every sort of contingency. This judgment arises most often—and justifiably so— from what he asserts in his Freedom of the Will (1754). A contrary judgment emerges, however, when his dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World (completed in 1755) is closely considered by itself. 2 This paper describes and then shows how Edwards’ argumentation entails that the physical universe and its constituent physical systems are contingent in three senses: freedom to choose, existential, and synchronic. |
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| ISSN: | 2159-6875 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Jonathan Edwards studies
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