Epistemic Traction: Gila Sher ; Bernard Lonergan, and Critical Realism

Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth and Logic is a recent work by the influential American analytical philosopher Gila Sher, professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. Sher, expert in the thought of Tarski and Quine, is also a noted contributor to technical deba...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Gregorianum
Main Author: Beards, Andrew 1957- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana 2018
In: Gregorianum
Year: 2018, Volume: 99, Issue: 4, Pages: 759-784
Further subjects:B Bernard Lonergan
B “Neurath’s boat”
B G. Frege
B Epistemology
B Critical Realism
B cognitional structure
B symbolic logic
B W. V. O. Quine
B Gila Sher
B IF logic
B periphery of logic
B Alonzo Church
B revision of logic
B analytical philosophy
B veridicality
B philosophy of mathematics
B D. Hilbert
B J. Hintikka
B A. Tarski
B centre of logic
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Summary:Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth and Logic is a recent work by the influential American analytical philosopher Gila Sher, professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. Sher, expert in the thought of Tarski and Quine, is also a noted contributor to technical debates in current symbolic logic. However, her work and the book in question –designed as one stepping-stone in the construction of a larger philosophical project – witness to very wide philosophical preoccupations. Sher therefore wishes to situate current research in logic within the broader perspectives ofphilosophy of mind and epistemology. The philosophical vision she outlines witnesses to the «openness» of the world of analytical philosophy in recent times to revisit and perhaps even radically revise the presuppositions on which it was founded over a century ago in order to pursue more authentically the goals of philosophical research. A good number of Sher’s philosophical preoccupations, which are far-reaching in scope, are shared in Bernard Lonergan’s philosophical writing. The article then opens up a dialogue and debate between the two philosophies. Among the aims of the article is the intention of making evident how fruitful such a dialogue may prove in light of new perspectives in analytical philosophy. But it also raises questions concerning certain empiricist models which, even when not acknowledged, may in effect manifest an undertow in the unfolding of philosophical arguments. The article, which also draws into the discussion the later work of Jaakko Hintikka, opens with remarks on an intriguing crossing of intellectual paths of Bernard Lonergan and one of the central figures in twentieth-century logic and analytical philosophy, Alonzo Church. This moment in Lonergan’s early development is enlightening as regards the wider issues treated in the article which concern epistemology, logic and human historically embedded intentionality. The article is to be published in two parts.
Contains:Enthalten in: Gregorianum