Why the divine purpose theory fails: a conversation with Thaddeus Metz
Thaddeus Metz’s new book ‘God, Soul and the Meaning of Life’ presents a brief analysis of supernaturalist views about the meaning of life – my specific concern being the Divine purpose theory. While the view locates meaning in the fulfilment of some divine mandate, I show that this theory is, at bes...
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| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Review |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis
2021
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| In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2021, Volume: 82, Issue: 4/5, Pages: 323-336 |
| Review of: | God, soul and the meaning of life (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2019) (Attoe, Aribiah D.)
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Existence of God
/ Supranaturalism
/ Meaning of life
/ Life
/ Objective aim
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Book review
B Supernaturalism B purpose theory B Metz B God B Meaning |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Thaddeus Metz’s new book ‘God, Soul and the Meaning of Life’ presents a brief analysis of supernaturalist views about the meaning of life – my specific concern being the Divine purpose theory. While the view locates meaning in the fulfilment of some divine mandate, I show that this theory is, at best, unattractive. In this essay, I challenge the view that a belief in God is not necessary for the Divine purpose theory to be viable. I show that if we were to agree that a belief in God is inconceivable, then a theory built on such a belief is, at best, wishful thinking. Arguing from a subjectivist perspective, I make clear the fact that any recourse to a godly mandate as what makes life meaningful inadvertently assumes an extrinsic and instrumental character, which makes such a pursuit an unattractive form of meaningfulness. Finally, I show that the God purpose theory is much too narrow as it fails to capture other paths to meaningfulness that do not involve a recourse to God, and also that any assigned purpose is unnecessary (and, therefore, unattractive), if God is all-knowing, all-powerful, etc. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2335 |
| Reference: | Kritik in "The meanings of God: reply to four critics (2021)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2021.2002713 |