Why the divine purpose theory fails: a conversation with Thaddeus Metz

Thaddeus Metz’s new book ‘God, Soul and the Meaning of Life’ presents a brief analysis of supernaturalist views about the meaning of life – my specific concern being the Divine purpose theory. While the view locates meaning in the fulfilment of some divine mandate, I show that this theory is, at bes...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Attoe, Aribiah D. 19XX- (Author)
Contributors: Metz, Thaddeus (Bibliographic antecedent)
Format: Electronic Review
Language:English
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Published: Taylor & Francis 2021
In: International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2021, Volume: 82, Issue: 4/5, Pages: 323-336
Review of:God, soul and the meaning of life (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2019) (Attoe, Aribiah D.)
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Existence of God / Supranaturalism / Meaning of life / Life / Objective aim
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NBC Doctrine of God
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Book review
B Supernaturalism
B purpose theory
B Metz
B God
B Meaning
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:Thaddeus Metz’s new book ‘God, Soul and the Meaning of Life’ presents a brief analysis of supernaturalist views about the meaning of life – my specific concern being the Divine purpose theory. While the view locates meaning in the fulfilment of some divine mandate, I show that this theory is, at best, unattractive. In this essay, I challenge the view that a belief in God is not necessary for the Divine purpose theory to be viable. I show that if we were to agree that a belief in God is inconceivable, then a theory built on such a belief is, at best, wishful thinking. Arguing from a subjectivist perspective, I make clear the fact that any recourse to a godly mandate as what makes life meaningful inadvertently assumes an extrinsic and instrumental character, which makes such a pursuit an unattractive form of meaningfulness. Finally, I show that the God purpose theory is much too narrow as it fails to capture other paths to meaningfulness that do not involve a recourse to God, and also that any assigned purpose is unnecessary (and, therefore, unattractive), if God is all-knowing, all-powerful, etc.
ISSN:2169-2335
Reference:Kritik in "The meanings of God: reply to four critics (2021)"
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2021.2002713