Deuten und Wählen: Vorbemerkungen zu einer moraltheologischen Handlungstheorie
It is the purpose of the present article to shed light upon the intrinsic structures of moral decision making and to indicate some reasons for the shift in contemporary ethics from a norm-theory to an act-theory. This is done primarily through a series of fundamental reflections regarding the over-a...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1981
|
| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1981, Volume: 62, Issue: 2, Pages: 231-275 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
| Summary: | It is the purpose of the present article to shed light upon the intrinsic structures of moral decision making and to indicate some reasons for the shift in contemporary ethics from a norm-theory to an act-theory. This is done primarily through a series of fundamental reflections regarding the over-all presuppositions of moral action. A first basic presupposition, and thus a key factor to be taken into consideration, is the immanent historicity of moral insight. A second presupposition is closely linked to the first: the phenomena leading to moral insight have to be interpreted by the subject. It is precisely this interpretation which moulds the ontic structures of moral decision making and elevates them to the level of moral criteria. The two presuppositions are complementary since the hermeneutical process takes place within the horizon of an anthropological choice made at a specific point in a person's own history. Thus, a clear distinction between moral values on the one hand and pre-moral but morally relevant discovery of the good on the other hand is needed; values are only realized through interaction with various goods. This is confirmed since the structures of moral action, when examined carefully, actually reflect such a gradual process of realization. All these preliminary considerations serve to deepen one's comprehension of the problems dealing with the « fontes moralitatis »: the relation between means and ends; the principle of double effect and the right understanding of the classical conditions of its application; the difference between direct and indirect acting. The epistemological framework, which was discussed in the first part of the article, gains greater plausibility because it is seen to be operative in all these areas. The proportionate reason which emerges from the hermeneutical process, insofar as it offers an ultimate criterion for acting, shapes the ontic structure of action itself. Thus, the structures are per se a secondary and conditioned criterion, since the primary and absolute criterion derives from the basic intentionality of the moral subject. Intentionality mediates moral absoluteness and in this way integrates the latter into the structures of moral action. These insights are therefore capable of adding clarity even to the problem of intrinsic good and evil. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
|