La crisi della metapsicologia freudiana. - I: Il paradigma positivista. Psicoanalisi, filosofia, Weltanschauung
Conceived as the first and more general stage of a research project on the "crisis of Freudian metapsychology", this article finds its impetus in the epistemology of Kuhn: the development of science so as to assure the revolution of a paradigm, and the connected concepts of Weltanschauung...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Italian |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
1980
|
| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1980, Volume: 61, Issue: 1, Pages: 97-136 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Conceived as the first and more general stage of a research project on the "crisis of Freudian metapsychology", this article finds its impetus in the epistemology of Kuhn: the development of science so as to assure the revolution of a paradigm, and the connected concepts of Weltanschauung and scientific spirit. The original paradigm employed by Freud is determined to be that of a medical positivism which tends to view psychology as a totally autonomous science. This conclusion results from a survey of those authors who have studied the relationship which links psychoanalysis, philosophy and Weltanschauung to each other. The notable ambivalence becomes clear which Freud manifested toward philosophy and which perdured even at the end of an irresolute period during which a protracted dispute divided his disciples into supporters or opponents of the need to expand psychoanalysis into a philosophy or into a general vision of the world. Freud's solution, presented in his Lecture 35a (1933) consists of introducing Weltanschauung as a general heading under which philosophy, religion and science can be subsumed. Yet his understanding of the word is so narrowly scientific that it becomes untenable since it excludes philosophy and religion altogether and demonstrates Freud's overreliance on the paradigm prevailing among scientists at the turn of the century. Characteristic of such a model was its anti-philosophical bias and its insistence on the selfsufficiency of science. Although Freud denies that psychoanalysis itself can become a Weltanschauung, the manner in which he makes an absolute of his paradigm has been pointed out by Kuhn and is verified in a systematic way in this article. It becomes evident that psychoanalysis may be consciously utilized in the service of a vision of the world which one embraces as a "faith". This possibility renders unacceptable the thesis of Waelder who advocates what he considers an unproblematic separation between philosophical discourse on the one hand and the metapsychological and clinical language of Freud's theory on the other. It is obviously necessary to draw out all the implications contained in the enigmatic fact that there is no coincidence between metapsychology and the entire thought system of Freudian psychology. This will demand a revision of the very way in which one confronts the contemporary crisis of metapsychology. Such a revision will be taken up in following contributions. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
|