Die Idee der Existenz bei Locke: Die Problematik eines bewusstseinsphilosophischen Realismus
For Locke the proper objects of human knowledge are ideas in our minds, not things. In this sense Locke's philosophy is a 'philosophy of mind' (Bewußtseinsphilosophie), not a 'philosophy of being' (Seinsphilosophie). On the other hand Locke is evidently a realistic philosoph...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1979
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1979, Volume: 60, Issue: 1, Pages: 85-146 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | For Locke the proper objects of human knowledge are ideas in our minds, not things. In this sense Locke's philosophy is a 'philosophy of mind' (Bewußtseinsphilosophie), not a 'philosophy of being' (Seinsphilosophie). On the other hand Locke is evidently a realistic philosopher and admits the existence of things which are independent of our knowledge. It is doubtful whether such a position is coherent: can reality be looked upon equally as idea in the mind and as a real thing or does one conception exclude the other? This question has to be posed not only regarding Locke but also regarding many other forms of modern and contemporary realistic philosophy. In this article Locke's idea of existence will be treated. Its ambiguity contains in nuce the whole problematic of a realistic philosophy of mind. Locke treats the idea of existence in the Essay on Human Understanding II, 7,7. The text contains three difficulties: First, existence is considered to be an idea. — Second, existence as an idea of reflection refers to ideas in the mind, and not to operations of the mind. — Third, the idea of existence refers equally to things and ideas. — The last point is the real problem: things exist, ideas we are conscious of. The two do not 'exist' in any similar way. If the idea of existence for Locke really means things and ideas, Locke has not a single idea of existence but a twofold and incoherent one. This article intends to show that, nevertheless, Locke's idea of existence has one single meaning and is, in principle, coherent: it means the passive presence or reception of ideas in the mind. Thus Locke's philosophy is, of course, linked closely with Descartes and with modern philosophy of mind in general. In a first part the general problematic of existence as an idea will be treated. — The second part treats the group of « Ideas Both of Sensation and Reflection », (Locke, Essay II, 7), to which the idea of existence belongs. — The third part applies the results of parts one and two to the idea of existence: First, existence an idea of sensation is reduced to an idea of reflection. Secondly, existence is shown to be the dependence of ideas in the mind upon a cause. Thirdly, Locke conceives the mind and its ideas like things. Fourthly, the proper meaning of existence for Locke is shown to be the reception of ideas into and by a passive mind. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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